







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John Carter Brown.





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Sabin 1787



AN  
APPEAL  
TO THE  
Sense of the People,  
ON THE  
Present Posture of Affairs.

WHEREIN

The Nature of the late Treaties are inquired into, and the Conduct of the M---i---y with Regard to *M--n--ca*, *A--r--ca*, &c. is considered ;

WITH

Some REMARKS upon the Light in which these, and other Publick Affairs have been lately represented.

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L O N D O N :

Printed for DAVID HOOKHAM, in Pater-noster Row.  
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JOHN CARTER BROWN.

RPJCB



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A N  
A P P E A L  
T O T H E  
Sense of the People.

**A**T a Time when so much malevolent Industry is exerted, by Slander, by Libels, by Cabals, and by every evil Art, to inflame the Passions of the People, an Appeal to their Reason, an Attempt to introduce a Moment's cool Reflection, in Matters of such Importance as those we are now engaged in, and at a Time so critical, cannot be improper, and will not, I hope, be ineffectual.

There is no Man who feels for his Country, who does not most sensibly feel our late Loss; and who is not touched with Indignation at the Disgrace our Flag has suffered. Our Glory has been tarnished in its brightest Part; and the Resentment we shew, the  
B Zeal



Zeal we manifest, for a strict Enquiry into the Offence, and for punishing the Offenders in a Manner adequate to their Offences, is not only just, but it is highly commendable.

But there are certain Instruments constantly at Work, who watch the Ebb and Flow of Affairs, and every little Change in the Minds of the People, that they may turn even our best Dispositions to the public Prejudice. Indeed, this much, in justice, must be allowed them; though their Arguments are the weakest imaginable, and their Designs as bad as their Arguments are weak, yet they understand perfectly well the Use of Conjunctures; they know how to *time* their Attacks in such a Manner, that the most shallow Cavillings shall pass for unanswerable Arguments; the most groundless Conjectures for demonstrated Truths; and their own Malice and Disaffection for Patriotism. *Facili civitate ad accipienda credendaque omnia nova, cum tristia sunt*; for at a time when People's Minds are sunk by any Misfortune, ill News chimes in with that Disposition, and may be almost said to be agreeable to it. Better Accounts and a more chearful Prospect are a Sort of Disappointments; and when we are soured with ill  
News,



News, and exasperated against a particular Person, it is not then difficult to push the Point farther; to beget Suspicions, to sow Rumours, to spread the Evil wide, and by Degrees to involve others in the Disgrace who are entirely free from the Guilt, favoured by the Confusion which attends indeterminate Accusations, and the Proneness which Mankind, when enraged, naturally have to multiply the Objects of their Anger. This is natural; and of this Time, and the Disposition it produced, an Advantage, and that of a very dangerous kind was taken by the Enemies of the public Tranquillity; to weaken our Confidence in each other; to take away all Strength from the Government, and to abate in the most shameful Manner the Reverence which thirty Years of the mildest and wisest Government had justly given us for our most excellent Sovereign.

These indeed were their Designs all along; but they are now so directly pursued; and in a manner so openly avowed, that their very Confidence of Success may prevent it: they have sprung their Mine too early, and without, I hope, hurting their Country, have discovered *Themselves*.



This may promise a fairer Hearing to the dispassionate Examination of the Measures which were taken for the general Good in this interesting Conjunction ; I say, I hope, a fair Hearing, because I am sure I propose nothing but a fair Representation of the Measures which were pursued ; and I mean no other Defence of them, than what such a plain Representation of them shall furnish. My Intention is to shew, in a plain and simple manner, the whole Scheme of our Operations, so far as a private Man may be supposed to comprehend it. I flatter myself, that when the whole Plan is laid together, all the Objections which have been raised to the detached Parts, and which never could have been raised were they not industriously separated, shewn out of their natural Order, and confounded with other Things wholly foreign to them, will vanish of themselves.

The very Excellence of any general and comprehensive System may often be the Cause of particular Failures ; but a wise and steady Minister, despising the little Criticks who feed upon little Faults, will keep his End constantly in View, and only regard what will be the capital Event on the *Total* of his Operations, without being disturbed or thrown out of his Course, for any particular  
in-



independent Successes the Enemy abroad may have, or the Advantages which the Enemy at home may derive from them.

Ill Success in some Instances we undoubtedly have had ; but I may confidently say, because in its proper Place I can make, and shall make it appear, that they did not arise from the Plan which was pursued, and that we could not have taken any other Method to prevent it, besides the Method that was taken, without deviating from Principles from which no Consideration should have obliged us to depart.

The Views for which we entered into this War are too generally understood to need any particular Explanation here. They chiefly regarded our Possessions in *America* : But though the Object be confined, the Operations necessary to attain it must be of a far more comprehensive Nature ; which makes it necessary to look towards our Situation in *Europe*, and to have an Eye on the Circumstances of which this Situation gives us a Prospect. In consequence of both these, of our Designs in *America*, and of the Effects they must necessarily have upon our *European* Connections, the first Part of our Scheme, as I conceive, must have been

To



To bind down the Arms of *France* on the Continent, by a Chain of judicious Alliances.

*Secondly*, To cut off the Resources of our Enemy, by destroying their Trade and seizing their Seamen.

*Thirdly*, To secure ourselves from an Invasion by a powerful Squadron in our own Ports ; and at the same time to block up the *French* Navy in their Ports, to prevent more effectually their Designs either on *Ireland* or *America*.

*Fourthly*, To send such a Force into *America* as might conclusively turn the Balance in that Part of the World in our Favour.

These, I conceive, were the Grounds upon which our Administration intended to form the whole Fabric of their Designs ; and if, as I suppose, very little can rationally be objected to the Ground-work, the Superstructure will appear well built ; and the whole taken together will make one entire well imagined Piece.

Convinced that the State of *Europe* is such, that all its Parts are so interwoven by Commerce,



merce, by Alliances, by Marriages, by common Interests, and by mutual Jealousies, that *England* and *France* can never be engaged in a War without engaging the most considerable Part of the rest of *Europe* incidentally; that no such thing as a partial War can be now expected, nor perhaps desired by us—Our Ministry acted in Conformity to this Face of Things.

They examined early the Situation of *Europe*; they enquired into the Strength, the Connections, the Inclinations, and the Character of the several Powers.

To the Northward they had evidently but two Choices;—either to confirm our ancient Alliances with *Russia*, or to project a new Alliance with *Sweden*.

With regard to the latter, the Work, had we undertaken it, would have been attended with infinite Difficulty; and if it could have been accomplished, would have been productive of nothing but Embarrassment and Confusion: To detach *Sweden* entirely from a *French* Interest would confessedly be a Work of Time, and much Trouble in the Management; and of much Uncertainty in the Event. Whether or no the Connexion  
with



with *France* be the real Interest of that Kingdom may be decided by speculative Politicians at their Leisure: But their long and almost hereditary Attachments to the Interest of *France*, the Eclat which this Alliance formerly had, and the general Prejudice which must have arisen from this, would throw almost unfurmountable Bars in the Way of a Negotiation with that State: But grant that we could perfectly have succeeded in the Object of such a Negotiation, and that *Sweden* were to declare heartily in our Favour, what could we expect from an Ally, of a Fidelity untried and unexperienced, but of Force lately tried and experienced to be very weak and ineffectual; of a Form of Government subjected to great Uncertainty of Counsels, and full of such Seeds of the Fire of Faction and Sedition, that it wanted but the least Spark of Opportunity to make it blaze out, and but the least Breath of Encouragement to rise to such a Flame as must devour all the Good we could have expected from their sincerest and heartiest Concurrence?

The other Side therefore was taken; and we treated with *Russia*, our ancient and indeed natural Ally, of whose great Strength we had not the least Reason to doubt. When  
this



this Alliance was formed, it was very natural to expect that a Counter-alliance must either have been formed or renewed against us. This, I say, was expected; but it was guarded against too; and the Ministry was conscious, that having secured *Russia* on our Side, all the Efforts made on the other must only add to that Security, must provoke, though insufficient to alarm the Empire of the *Muscovite*; which is of itself, but beyond all Doubt by our Assistance is more than sufficient to overawe both *Sweden* and *Denmark*. Powers that for very obvious Reasons, can hardly ever be cordially united; and if they should unite, it must be by Ties weak and precarious, whilst Jealousy from within, and a formidable Power from without, by some promised Advantages, and by the Terror of its Arms, would be always ready to dissolve the feeble Bands of such a Confederacy; or if it should fail of that, at least to take away all Power of its operating to our Prejudice.

Affairs are so circumstanced in that Part of the World, that a close Alliance with one Party, naturally draws the Disgust of the other; and in this Case, what reasonable Man would hesitate a Moment which Party to embrace? We did not in the least hesitate to

C ally



ally with *Russia*, foreseeing indeed the Consequences that would probably result from it in Counter-alliances ; but securing ourselves against them by the Power of the Party we espoused, and by the Measures which were wisely and effectually taken to embarrass *some other Powers*, and to find them Employment at home ; convinced at the same time that nothing amongst ourselves could be objected to this Treaty, but such Cavils as would have the very same Force, provided we left any one considerable State of *Europe* out of our Confederacy.

Whilst we looked towards the North, we had nothing to fear from this Treaty ; but we had other, and farther Views, wherein we had reason to hope from it no small Advantages. The Consequences of one prudent Step are never confined to the immediate ones.

The Alliance with *Russia* was a fertile Alliance. What was the Result ? Not what some prophetick Patriots, *in the Enthusiasm of their Policy*, had so confidently foretold. It did not force *Prussia* into the Arms of *France*. Quite contrary was the Effect ; it influenced the Prudence of that great and wise Prince to detach himself entirely from *France*, and  
enter



enter into a strict Alliance with our Court. If these Gentlemen indeed had advised him, he might probably have acted as they foretold ; but providentially they were neither his nor our Counsellors.

His *Prussian* Majesty has on Foot one of the most numerous, and by far the best disciplined Army upon Earth : But it is the Man, it is the Character of the Prince himself, which is the great Gain we have in this Alliance ; a Prince of the most penetrating Genius, of the most extensive Views, and of the most active Disposition ; who understands the true Use of Opportunities, *knows them when they happen, and never fails to make the earliest and most effectual Use of them* ; who weighs his Strength, and discerns just how far he ought to go in all his Projects ; well informed of the most minute Parts of his own or his Neighbours Concerns, vigilant, brave, and enterprising ; whose Business, whose Amusements are military, and whose whole Dominions are a Sort of Camp. This Prince so situated, at the Head of such a Body of Troops, and taking the Field, if Occasion were, with a Reputation so established, is a most valuable Acquisition. If we have restored to him the Captures which were made in the last War, it was far from



relinquishing any Right we had claimed, as has been falsely suggested : If a Point is yielded by Favour, how far does that bind us from insisting rigidly on our Right upon other Occasions, or from Parties we have not the same Reason to favour ?—If I have taken my Neighbour's Cattle trespassing on my Grounds and impounded them; but finding afterwards that I want his Friendship, I, on an Agreement with him, deliver up his Cattle and release the Damages; will any one say this is giving up my Right? Or that he, and every Neighbour I have befriended, may afterwards legally claim the same Indulgence at Pleasure? And is it to be believed, that there are People among us who have the Folly to say we ought to have lost this valuable Alliance, to have thrown this excellent Game out of our Hands *in a Pet*, rather than have made a Payment to the Amount of a few disputed Captures, at a Time too when his *Prussian* Majesty had five times their Value in Effects of this Nation absolutely in his Power?

Having taken Notice of one so glaring a Piece of Absurdity, it will be a Sort of Excuse for mentioning one more, of the same Nature, and vented by the same Author; it is on the Subject of this Alliance. He is pleased to observe, that this Treaty is directly contrary to that we had made with *Russia*; because the  
*Russians*



*Russians* have engaged to send Sixty Thousand Men to the Assistance of *Great Britain*, which he concludes, and not improbably, were designed to serve in *Germany*; and that afterwards it was stipulated by the King of *Prussia*, that he would employ his Force to keep all Foreigners out of the Empire. This is the Substance of the Objection, which he has amplified without Measure, and spun out with a Thousand Turnings and Windings, and Repetitions, *according to his vain Custom*.

But the Solution is easy; and a little Explanation of the Design of these Treaties will effectually remove this, and all other Objections against them. As soon as the King of *Prussia* saw that we had entered into the *Russian* Alliance, he was at no Loss to divine our Motive to it. It regarded himself, and he was not long without coming to the Explanation we had most Reason to desire: He offered all that we could ask, because he engaged to raise no Disturbances himself, nor to suffer others to raise any; which was the very Thing, and the only Thing we desired: We had no Ends to gain in *Germany*, and therefore we had no Reason to wish for an Army of *Russians* to act offensively there: This latter Alliance rendered that as unnecessary as upon other Accounts it was undesirable; because  
the



the Object of the Treaty, the Tranquillity of *Germany* was more effectually secured; and all the Designs of *France* to embarrass us in that Quarter entirely baffled. The two Alliances, so far from being inconsistent, cannot be understood unless they are taken together, as dependent Parts of the same Piece; nor is there any other Difference between them, than between Cause and Effect; the former of these Alliances was the Medium through which we arrived at the latter.

We had Reason to entertain some Jealousy, lest *France* should raise a Storm against us in a Quarter where she had formerly much and dangerous Influence: The Engagement with *Russia* was entered into with a View of casting a Weight into the other Side of the Balance, and of counteracting this Influence: This was its real Design, and it had its Effect; when the King of *Prussia* seeing the Necessity of taking pacific Measures, offered to enter into Engagements with us, the Purpose of the former Alliance was fully answered, we had nothing to apprehend in *Germany*, and consequently it was nothing inconsistent with the Substance of the *Russian* Treaty to enter into mutual Engagements with his *Prussian* Majesty, to keep Foreigners out of the Empire. Having nothing to  
fear



fear from him, nothing could have been more eligible for us. Thus do the idle Ojections to the contradictory Stipulations in these Treaties vanish of themselves, the Moment the Design comes to be understood.

But suppose that his *Prussian* Majesty should be engaged in Difficulties, which in the present Disposition of some Courts seems not impossible ; and suppose that the Court of *Petersburg* was inclined to march an Army to his Assistance, which is not indeed so probable ; but should this be the Case, and 'tis the Case the Letter-writer supposes, who then for a Moment can fancy that this Prince would have thought himself bound by an Article of a Treaty entered into for his own Advantage, to oppose the Progress of those Troops, which are marching to his own Assistance ? Or who is so ignorant as not to know that this Manner of wording a Treaty cannot at all affect the Substance of it, which, like the Substance of all Treaties, is for the Benefit of the contracting Powers ?

But to return : No Man could in Reason suppose that the Tranquillity of the North and of *Germany* were not as effectually secured by these Measures, as human Wisdom could secure it. And if the Treaty be kept  
with



with any common Degree of good Faith, we may answer for it that our Object is yet secure : But if a Power who owed her surviving the last War, to the Interposition of *Great Britain*, should now, in Conjunction with those who in that very War aimed at her utter Ruin, excite Disturbances in the Empire ; and if it be possible that, contrary to the Stipulations of a Treaty just entered into in Confirmation of an old Alliance, another Power should so far forget all Faith as to be inactive in our Favour, or assistant to distress us ; this, as it could not be at all foreseen, so is it not at all chargeable to those who advised the Treaty ; because a Minister is answerable only for such things as from the Temper and Policy of the Court he engages with, he might have apprehended. But he is not answerable for such Breaches of Faith as sometimes arise, not from a political Sense of their real or supposed Interest, but from personal Whims and Caprice, by which Fortune sometimes overturns the best laid and wisest Projects : No Alliance can be built on a firmer Basis ; *nor did any one of those Gentlemen who are so fertile in Objections to all that is done, amongst all their Cavils, once make even a random Guess at this ;* nor indeed could it be supposed or suspected with any Colour of Reason. In consequence of  
the



the same Plan, we were far from rejecting the Alliance offered by the Court of *Berlin*; and if the Pride and false Policy of the Court of *Vienna* made the two Alliances incompatible, there is one Consideration, which above all others ought to have given the Preference to this rather than to an *Austrian* Alliance. Had we engaged with *Austria*, this had infallibly drawn on them a Quarrel with *France*, who would immediately have fallen on *Flanders*; that Part of the World where *France* can make War with the greatest Advantage, where all her Resources are at Hand; where she can attack with the greatest Probability of Success; but where it is difficult, if not impossible, to attack her with any. We should once more have the whole Weight of that unavailing Defence upon our own Shoulders, as we always had; and should find the *Low Countries* the same insatiable Gulph for our Blood and Treasure that we always did.

But now, as *France* has no Pretence for Hostilities upon that Side, she can only act in *Germany* or *Italy*; Countries in which they must struggle with infinite Difficulties, and which have proved fatal to the *French* Arms in almost all Ages.

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After



After all, what mighty Advantages can *France* promise herself from the Discontent of the Queen, or the Measures which that Discontent gave Birth to? *France* has gained, it must be granted, an Ally of great Power; but an Ally which is altogether as heartily disposed to promote the Interest of the House of *Bourbon*, as the House of *Bourbon* is disposed to labour seriously for the Aggrandisement of the House of *Austria*. The only Way in which this Alliance is like to be very lasting and sincere is, that both Parties should be very low; for it is impossible, with Interests so very jarring as theirs, that their Successes should not be a great Cause of mutual Jealousies. Where there is so much Ambition on both Sides, and such a Rivalship as naturally subsists between these Powers, however particular Exigencies may unite them, they can never be much in Earnest in throwing a great deal of Power into each other's Scale. But allowing the Stability and Cordiality of this Alliance to be never so great; if by our joining with *Prussia* we have added *Austria* to the Strength of *France*, this Junction of *France* and *Austria*, so ominous to the Liberties of *Germany*, should secure us the Friendship of the other Princes of the Empire, and will rivet our Alliance with *Prussia* beyond all Power



Power of being moved : So that in whatever Light we consider our Treaties, they carry evident Marks of Wisdom ; they are the plain Result of *one* well digested Plan ; all of whose Parts co-operate in one uniform Design : They produce, and they support each other : They are not formed of Parties mutually jealous, nor of Interests incompatible ; they are the judicious Effects of Choice, and not the bungling Patch-work of Necessity.

As a Contrast to this, it is not unpleasant to take a View of the Conduct of those who oppose and vilify these Treaties at home. First, contrary to all Reason, they opposed all Alliances on the Continent as burthensome and useless to us ; and now, in a Manner as contrary to *the* plain Face of Facts, they complain, *as a great Loss*, that we have driven all the powerful States of *Europe* from our Alliance ; and this they do in the same Breath with which they cavil at the Stipulations, which were made in our Treaties with such States as *Muscovy* and *Prussia*. It is true, that inferior useful Alliances were cultivated at the same Time, and surely with great Judgment. The Alliance with *Hesse*, and the Succours of *Hanover* are no mean



Reinforcement, nor at all inconsistent with *the System* of our other Engagements ; and very necessary to our Safety here. As to the *merry Gentleman* who has made a *serious* Defence of the Ministry, if we allow him to have Wit, it is, I suppose, all he will desire of us : But if we do allow him this Property, must we not at the same Time remind him, that in Time of public Danger the Patriot would exert his good Sense, not his Wit ? He would not attempt to make his Countrymen laugh at their Misfortunes, but would teach them to deserve good Fortune, by unanimously pursuing these Measures that have been contrived for the Good of their Country : When we see any one act otherwise, must we not suspect that he *chuses to be mistaken himself*, or to deceive others ? And knowing that any burlesque Piece does not admit of a serious Answer, he chose that Way, of propagating such Notions as might serve his own End, hoping he would by some, at least, be believed, because the Nature of his Work did not admit he should be answered by any Body.

Having thus chosen Allies, whose Power might make them effective, and whose common Interest might keep them steady in our Cause ;



Cause; and having disposed the whole so judiciously that the several Parts supported each other, and in such a Manner that the Efforts of the Enemy must only bind them still closer, our Business was to consider how we should assault *France* in such a Manner as might, *in the End*, turn the Balance of the War in our Favour.

When we look over all the Wars which have harrassed *Europe* for the preceding Centuries, we must be convinced that not that Nation, which has had the greatest Victories, but that Nation which has had the greatest Resources prevailed in the End; not that Party which gave the most Blows, but that which had the longest Breath, came off with Advantage. The Successes in the Field undoubtedly had their Influence; but that Power which could best raise the Supplies for the ensuing Year had the best Chance of dictating in the Treaty of Peace.

To say the Truth, in almost all the late Wars, all Parties have been near equally exhausted; they have given out through mere Weariness, and failing of the great Purposes which they fought in the Field, have been content with over-reaching each other in smaller



smaller Matters by the Finesses of Negotiation.

Sensible of this, our great Point was to make an early and vigorous Stroke *at the very Heart of Affairs*; not by some transient Success in the Field, nor even by seizing some important Fortrefs; for these in the End are not decisive: But such a Stroke as should cut off the Resources of *France*; and which must in the End disable her from paying Armies, or maintaining Fortresses, or by any Means coming into Competition with us in Point of naval Strength. For this Purpose we have entirely broke their Trade, we have interrupted their Communication with their Colonies, and we have secured upwards of Eight Thousand of their real acting Seamen, and Five Hundred of their Ships in our Ports. If this should appear but a slight Advantage to us, and no material Prejudice to the Enemy, as with other curious Paradoxes has been advanced lately,

I desire every candid Person to consider, what we, who have so much a greater Number of Seamen, and *so much* a more extensive Trade, must have suffered if we had such a Loss, and at such a Time: If we do not find it  
easy



easy to raise Supplies now, what Difficulties should we have to support then? If now we are pushed to man our Navy properly, what a Struggle should we have then? If a War in which few Captures have been made, none indeed worth mentioning, has thrown some Damp on Credit and on Trade, what a Stagnation of Business, and almost universal Bankruptcy would have been produced among us? If a Faction, and the Libellers who support it, have taken such Advantages to sow Discord among us on account of the Loss of *Minorca*, what had they not said and done in such a Conjunction to throw us into utter Confusion?

To know thoroughly how Matters stand, put yourself into the Enemies Condition, and suppose him in yours, and then form your Judgment.—Indeed the Losses on the one Side will bear no Sort of Comparison with those on the other. In losing *Minorca*, it is true, we lost a very convenient Port, situated in such a Manner as to afford us signal Advantages in the *Mediterranean*; nor do I mean to extenuate our Misfortunes. It was a considerable one, and without Doubt much to be lamented.

But



But let us suppose Matters reversed: Let us suppose, that *Minorca* had been an Island belonging to *France*, and that we had just made ourselves Masters of it; but that *France*, on the other Hand, had secured the very Flower of our Seamen, detained the greater Part of our best trading Ships, plundered us of above a Million of our most valuable Merchandise, and blocked up our Squadrons in our Ports, should we in this Case set the Balance in our Favour? By no Means—Our Party-libellers, whilst they swelled and exaggerated our Losses, far from considering *Minorca* in the Light I have just viewed it, would have found a *perpetual Harvest of Burlesque and Ridicule*, in the Barrenness and Insignificance of that Island; they would have estimated its Produce, they would have calculated its Revenue, they would have compared it with the Expence of reducing and keeping the Place; and far from balancing between that Acquisition and our Losses, they would never have allowed that the Advantages could bear any Proportion to what was expended in the Acquisition.

If they had not acted thus, I appeal to all the Hearers of their Speeches, and the Readers of their Pamphlets, whether they would  
not



not intirely have altered their Measures, and proceeded in a Spirit wholly different from that which has been employed to *exasperate* our Passions and pervert our Judgments for this Twelvemonth past.

Stating then the Matter between *France* and us: The Loss of *Minorca* though great is not decisive; nor can it much affect the Issue of the War upon the whole. But what *France* has suffered, as it falls directly upon her Trade, must deeply affect the very Issue: As the War continues the Expences encrease, whilst from the great Losses they have had, and those which they have Reason yet to apprehend, the Means of supplying them must diminish in Proportion. A *lamed* Revenue, a shattered Commerce, a People over-taxed, with an internal *Grumbling*, *Discontent*, and *Penury*, are Things mortal to a State, in the Course of a War of any Continuance.

It is but too natural for Mankind to undervalue the Advantages of which they are in Possession, and to over-rate those that fall to the Share of their Rivals and Enemies. But in our Case, nobody, I imagine, could be deceived, unless great Management were  
E
used



used, to carry on the Imposition. Whilst the Trade of *France*, and the Revenue, which must draw its chief Subsistence from that Source, is yet in a more wretched Plight than I have represented it, our Ships have sailed in a Manner unmolested through every Part of the Ocean, and reaped as rich a commercial Harvest as in the sereneest Seasons.

Even since the Declaration of War, now upwards of three Months, our Trade in all its Fulness, has scarce had any Loss : And even the little we have suffered, is far more than repaid by the Prizes we still take from that of *France*, drained and exhausted as it already is. The trading Part of the Nation methinks ought to understand, and to shew a proper Sense of it. If a Trade unmolested, a Revenue flourishing, and consequently Resources abundant, ought to be reckoned as Blessings in the Midst of a War, or the Proof of well laid Designs, which Time, that Friend to all wise Contrivances, will more and more illustrate every Day, if our own Discontent, Impatience, and Rashness, with the Arts of ill-designing Men, do not make us turn our Backs upon these Prof-



Prospects, and hinder us from acquiring those valuable Objects we have in View.

What I consider as a third Part of the Plan of this War, was to provide effectually for our Security at home. How much an Invasion would have disconcerted, all our Projects, to say no worse, must be obvious; and how much the Accomplishment of all our Designs abroad must have depended upon our Security at home, must be no less obvious. In a Country without Fortifications, where our Capital, our All is but a few Days March from a defenceless Seacoast; and where the Loss of one Battle in the Country would have been nearly decisive against us, an Invasion of all things was what we ought most to have dreaded, and best to have provided against, whilst *France* had such an immense Force hovering over us. We ought not to have suffered ourselves to be laughed out of Apprehensions so just. Great Cause we had to apprehend an Attempt of this Nature; and indeed the slightest Causes of Apprehension ought not to have been despised when so much was at Stake; and I might venture to say, that nothing but the wise and effectual Precautions that were taken, hin-



dered this Design of *France* from being put  
 in Execution. But it is said, “ We ought  
 “ to have provided at the same Time for  
 “ the Security of all our Dominions, and  
 “ not suffer the Limbs to be lopped off  
 “ whilst we guarded the Head.” This is  
 undoubtedly true: But before we can un-  
 derstand clearly the Nature of this Matter,  
 or how far those who conducted our Affairs  
 are to blame for a Failure in any Part of  
 them, we must take a View of the Situa-  
 tion of our Dominions in *Europe*, compared  
 with those of *France*; and of the Advan-  
 tage or Prejudice which result to either  
 Party from this Circumstance. The Do-  
 minions of *France* consist of one great Tract  
 of Land, compact and entire in itself, not  
 to be attacked in any Part that may not  
 readily be relieved by the Force of the  
 Whole; and that Force is not only always  
 at hand, but very considerable in itself;  
 which makes an Attempt upon any Part of  
 the *French* Dominions in *Europe* one of the  
 most hazardous Undertakings imaginable.  
 But the Dominions of *Great Britain* are  
 disjointed and dispersed: In these Seas they  
 consist of two Countries, divided by the  
 Sea; of which *Great Britain* itself is no-  
 thing so compact as *France*, its internal  
 Force



Force not so great, nor so central: Another Part of our *European* Dominion lies at the southern Extremity of *Spain*; and a third at a considerable Distance from that, and at an immense Distance from *England*, in the *Mediterranean* Sea. But *France* has not only defensive Advantages which we have not, but her offensive ones are very great against all her Neighbours, and against us in particular; for she, as it were, lies between our Dominions, and looks at once into those distant Seas in which they lie. She is at hand to attack us in either, whilst our Force is very far removed from the Defence of one Part: *Minorca* is not above three Days Sail from *Toulon*, it is twenty at least from *Great Britain*.

These Considerations will enable us the better to judge, what we had to do when *France* made great Preparations at *Toulon* for a naval Equipment, and the Transportation of a Body of Troops, at the same time that she prepared another Squadron in the Harbour of *Brest*, and hovered over our Coast with a formidable Army, which overspread all the Shores of *Picardy*, *Normandy*, and *Bretagne*. At this Time our extensive Trade employed a great Part of our numerous



rous Fleet to defend it in that perfect Security which by that means it has enjoyed ; another Part was abroad, in pursuance of the Scheme to destroy that of the Enemy, which never ought to have been relinquished, and in which it acted so effectually ; and others were stationed where particular Exigencies had before required them, too distant for a sudden Recal.

Thus circumstanced, we had but four Choices to make :

The first was to send a formidable Fleet to the *Mediterranean*, as soon as ever we had Reason to suspect the Destination of the Armament at *Toulon*, and to have left thereby our own Coast naked and defenceless, whilst threatened by so great an Army, speedily and easily to be landed upon a forsaken Shore.

A second Course might have been taken for the Relief of *Minorca* ; which was to have kept a good Squadron at home, and destined to that Expedition the Fleet which blocked up the Harbour of *Brest* ; from whence a *French* Squadron might sail to *North America*, or to the *West Indies*, and attain



attain a great and dangerous Superiority in those interesting Parts of the World.

A third Method might have been taken, which was to divide what Ships we had fit for Service into three Squadrons; and keeping one at home, destine another for *Brest*; and send the third into the *Mediterranean*; and thus, by dividing our Forces, leave ourselves no effectual Force in any Part.

A fourth Method remained, and this was pursued, which was to let *Minorca* confide in the known Strength of *St. Philip's* Fort, and the experienced Courage and Fidelity of the Commander, until a Fleet could be got ready, which, without destroying the other Parts of the Plan, might baffle that of the *French*, defeat their Fleet, and relieve the Place.

In these Circumstances, which of the four Methods was the most eligible? Not according to the Event, but according to probable Appearances at that Time? What had not been said, if so egregious and fatal an Error had been committed, as that of leaving the Kingdom exposed to an Invasion which threatened it every Moment,  
and



and from which we had every ruinous Consequence to apprehend, to our Lives, our Properties, our Liberties, our Religion, every Thing? How inexcusable had the Ministry been, if, contrary to all just Maxims of Policy, they in this Case had neglected the *Caput Rerum*?

An Error of this Kind might not improbably have been our last, and have left little Difference between the Accusers and Accused, before a *French Tribunal*.

Should we then strip *England* of those wooden Walls, the only Defence which we have been so often told ought even to be attempted, rather than defer the Relief of *Mahone* for one Moment after the first Rumour that *France* designed to attack it?

If we had followed the second Method; and in consequence of it, the *Brest* Squadron had sailed with a great Body of Land Forces to *America*, the Cry had been loud, universal; and what would have given it more Force than its Loudness or Universality, it had been just in the highest Degree; and no Complaints had been too bitter, no Satires too severe, if the Administration had

ne-



neglected that most material Part, the very Object of the War?

As for the third Method, it is too obviously weak to suppose any Persons whatever could have fallen into it.

What then was left to be chosen but the fourth? For another Choice, I do not suppose was left, and the three first were clearly bad. The fourth then was adopted—No Part of the principal Design was relinquished by this; no Advantage was given the Enemy, either on our own Coast or in *America*; and yet a Force strong enough was sent, and at a Time early enough; indeed as early as possible, consistent with our Ability, with Safety, Honour, or Prudence; a Force that, in the Opinion of all, would have secured us the Place, had not the Disobedience of one Officer (on whom I do not purpose to lean, since by proper Authority he has suffered for it) or the much stranger Conduct of another, thrown those Advantages, with which the Vigour and Prudence of the Administration had armed him, entirely out of our Hands.

If we knew, as a simple View of the Plan might have made us know, that Fort *St. Philip's* was a Place hardly second to any in *Europe* for Strength, and fortified by every Advantage of Nature, and every Con-

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trivance



trivance of Art ; if we knew the Nature of the Country of *Minorca*, which laid the Besiegers under innumerable Difficulties ; if we were convinced of the Honour and Capacity of the Governor, what Error was committed in not stripping our own Coast, to send Mr. *Bing*'s Fleet before the middle of *March*, for so soon was he appointed to the Command, when the *French* Fleet did not sail till the 12th of *April*, did not land before the 18th, nor opened the Trenches, to be afterwards carried on with infinite Difficulty, before the 25th ? It is agreed upon all Hands, that Mr. *Bing*, notwithstanding his Delay here till the 9th of *April*, might have reached *Minorca* on the 5th of *May* with great Ease ; now what Scheme was ever yet accused of Delay, which was calculated to relieve a Place of the most immense Strength, attacked under so many Disadvantages, ten Days after the Trenches were opened before it ? Or supposing, as the Fact was, that the Relief did not arrive even for fourteen Days after this Time ; and that this was foreseen, which no human Prudence could foresee, who could blame a Relief as delayed, which subjected a Place of such first-rate Strength, and at best but of secondary Consideration, to a Siege of Twenty-four Days ; to secure the



the very Being of a Nation, and the most valuable Objects of the War? But in reality the Place held out Thirty Days longer than this furthest unforeseen Period of its Relief: And supposing the Relief so contrived as to arrive no earlier than this Period, is it a very extraordinary Presumption to reckon upon such a Place's holding out only half the Time it was actually maintained? And longer the Fleet even under this Commander could not have been delayed: But that the Fleet performed no effectual Service; that the Place was not relieved, and that the Admiral did not act conformably to his Country's Expectations, is but too true. But what had this to do with the Original Design? Certainly nothing.

But why, say they, should this Man at all have been employed? Let me in my Turn ask, why he should not have been employed? Who, of all those Gentlemen who are now grown so wise by the Event of Things, then objected to him? Why should not he have been employed, who was bred from his Infancy to maritime Affairs, had a Skill undisputed, a Courage unquestioned, and an Honour untainted, till that fatal Day? Who had his own Reputation, the Example of an heroic Father, and



the Honour of a noble Family before his Eyes to excite him to his Duty, in a Command which he himself had solicited? Had his Solicitation been rejected; had this Command been given to another, and had he unhappily failed, as this Man has, the Tide of Declamation had run more violently the other Way; and these promising Circumstances, which seemed to mark him out for playing a noble Part on a Theatre, where his Father had acted so gloriously, had been founded every where to the Disgrace of a Ministry which had the Blindness to neglect such an apparent Designation. But Objections of the weakest Kind are admitted against Expeditions which want Success; such is that of Mr. *Bing's* not having had a sufficient Force: But it must never be allowed, that we ought not to reckon on Mr. *Edgcombe's* Squadron as next to certain; for we must always reckon that an Officer will do his Duty, as Mr. *Edgcombe* did his; and that therefore he would in all Probability quit *Mahone* as early as possible, to join the Squadron, he must have expected, and did expect to fail to its Relief: But if ten of the ablest, best appointed Ships, that ever sailed out of *Britain*, with this Reinforcement, are not able to engage with Assurance of Success, twelve *French*,  
foul



foul and but indifferently equipped, I do not know what Men can depend upon: It very rarely happens that Matters can be so circumstanced as to assure us of meeting the Enemy when we are two to one; an Equality, or a small Superiority, is all that ought reasonably to be expected; and truly otherwise all the great and noble Actions that ever were performed, and that we have been used to admire, must be accused of Folly and Imprudence; *Bravery must be termed Foolishness, Cowardice must be called Prudence.*

Tho' I am convinced, and I hope it appears very satisfactorily to the Reader, that the Failure of this Expedition is no way imputable to the Ministry; yet neither do I think that on the Success or Failure of such a Measure, the Event of the War can principally depend.

By adhering steadily to the Plan which was laid down, the Enemy is wasted by Degrees, and we may look forward with Confidence, to make *France* yield up *Minorca*, with the rest of her Encroachments, by the Issue of a well conducted War.

No Man indeed can promise, if Things  
should



should entirely change Hands, and other Men, with new and inconsistent Designs, should make a Babel of the whole of our foreign Schemes, stagger our Allies, by the Instability of our Measures, and confound every internal Arrangement; in such a Case, no Man can answer for the Event, let the first Dispositions have been ever so judiciously concerted.

Scarce is the Clamour on the Subject of *Makone* more violent or more unreasonable, than that which has been raised concerning the Conduct of our Affairs in *America*.

That our first Efforts there have not been attended with all that Success, which from the general Plan of Operations in that Country, we might have promised ourselves, I am not at all surprized.

The *French* have gained over to their Friendship and Alliance most of the savage Nations; and this not owing more to their own Art, and the inconstant Disposition of that Sort of People, than to the ill Conduct and unwise Measures pursued by our Countrymen there; at once despising and provoking the Savages, and thereby forcing them, as it were, into the Arms of *France*,  
who



who has reaped all those Advantages which result from a perfect Knowledge of the Country, from a Readiness in harrassing a Frontier, from Secrecy in marauding Expeditions, and that Dexterity at Surprizes which is the distinguishing Characteristic of every savage Nation. They have therefore all the Benefits arising from a superior Knowledge of an irregular Warfare ; these are ever of a more glaring than solid Nature ; they confound at first by their Novelty : The Unwary are surprized : But their Successes never discompose or dishearten a wise Man ; for Novelty soon wears off ; whereas the Advantages of Discipline continue and strengthen daily : Every Success which Irregulars of this Sort meet with, is a Prejudice to them in their future Expeditions ; they put the Enemy upon their Guard, they familiarize him to such Attacks, and teach him no longer to dread them ; while they are themselves put off their Guard by a Confidence which Success without Discipline never fails to inspire.

Our Troops are by Degrees habituated to the Country, and to the Nature and Manner of the War ; our Resources are large in that Country, and we are taught how to make the best Use of them. The Strength of  
the



the *French* is merely in the Savages, whose Friendship any remarkable ill Success on their Side will be sure to shake. They have a Country not populous enough to recruit Armies, nor fruitful enough to subsist them for any considerable Time; and their Supplies from *Europe* are precarious of themselves, by Means of a long, troublesome, and dangerous Navigation, and surely little to be depended on while our Fleets are superior.

Our Colonies in *North America* confessedly have a great Superiority over those of *France*, whether we consider the Number of People, the Greatness of the Settlements, the Improvement of the Soil, or the Extent of the Trade; but there are Circumstances too, in which we are much inferior to them. In what relates to carrying on a War with Advantage, in which an Uniformity in Command, in Affections and in Counsels, is of the greatest Moment. To this Uniformity, from the very Constitution of our Colonies, we were a long Time Strangers. Hence arose some Failures and Delays, some Embarrassments in the Contrivance, and more in the Execution of our Schemes of Operation.

His Majesty's *American* Dominions consist



sist of a vast Tract of Land, divided into  
 a Variety of distinct independent Govern-  
 ments; distinct not only with regard to the  
 Persons of their Governors, but differing  
 in the very Forms of their Government:  
 In some of which the roval Authori-  
 ty has but little Weight; and in others  
 is but ill ascertained; in many of which  
 there are internal Jealousies, the severel  
 Parts that compose their Legislature being  
 at Variance amongst themselves, and in  
 most a Jealousy of their neighbouring Co-  
 lonies, which makes them frequently re-  
 gard each other's Prosperity with an evil  
 Eye; add to this, all those unhappy reli-  
 gious Differences which in the Beginning of  
 the last Century distracted the Mother-  
 Country, still subsists in that Part of the  
 World, not only simply as Sects, but in a  
 manner moulded into their severel Govern-  
 ments, and influencing them not a little.  
 These are Impediments which cannot be  
 immediately and all at once removed, or  
 their ill Effects remedied; and it is ridicu-  
 lous in the highest Degree to charge that as  
 a Crime on the Ministry, which arose from  
 the natural Circumstances of the Country  
 itself. Whether this Division of Govern-  
 ment and Latitude in Religion, permitted  
 or encouraged in the severel Reigns in  
 G which



which those Colonies were founded, be according to the best Ideas of Policy, it is not my Business to inquire ; but it may be thought a little hard, that a Ministry of this Day, should bear the Blame of an ill-judged Scheme, contrived and executed an hundred Years before they were born.

These Inconveniences, in the Constitution of the Colonies (for such they are at least with Respect to the present Object) which the present Ministry neither caused, nor could easily redress, begin already to be less felt, and less to impede the Designs which are carrying on for their common Preservation. What no Wisdom perhaps could have done, the Miseries felt by many, and apprehended by them all, has at length effected. These, have taught them the Necessity of laying aside their Disputes amongst themselves, their Jealousies of their Neighbours, and their obstinate religious Prejudices, in favour of the common Safety. Co-operating with the beginning of this happy Disposition, the Ministry has sent over a General of Reputation and Rank ; several excellent Officers under him, and a Body of regular Troops to strengthen and bring into Form the irregular Forces raised in that Country.

The



The Writer, whom I have so often met in my Way before, presents himself here too, and with his usual *Moderation*, and that *Consistency* and *Justness of Observation* which distinguishes his Character. He is convinced, that a Body of regular Forces ought to have been sent on that Service; but no sooner has he called for these Forces, than, finding that they were sent, he complains heavily of it, and tells you, “Your fellow Subjects were kidnapped, and sent the Lord knows where.” Tho’ I do not rate this Gentleman’s Sagacity quite so high as he esteems it himself, yet I believe he is at no great Loss to guess where they were sent; but this Author is a Man of professed Pleasantry, and mentions many Things which he knows have no sort of Force, merely for the Sport of imposing them on his Readers as serious Arguments. This will serve as a Key to several Parts of his Pamphlet, where, in a grave and even solemn Manner, he utters the most absurd and ludicrous Things imaginable; and sparing no Character, not even that which he professes himself to honour and admire, he introduces a Letter from Mr. *Blakeney*, written by *the Lord knows who*, and sent *the Lord knows where or to whom*: For assuredly it was never written by Mr. *Blakeney*.



In another Place he is hugely displeased, that you have so ruffled your Enemies, that you have made the politest Nation in *Europe* lose their Temper and Complaisance, and condescend to very low Scurrility; but I think my Countrymen will not suppose a Minister deserves to lose his Seat, though he has taken such *uncivil* Measures as to make both *France* and *this Letter-writer* downright angry, and equally scurrilous. To this curious Complaint he adds another full as curious, that your fellow Subjects were seduced by a Promise of serving at home only. Can he be supposed serious in this? Would it not be the highest Absurdity to stipulate with Soldiers where and how they shall serve, at the Time of their being levied? Can it be believed they ever had such a Promise from Authority? Indeed how far the recruiting Officers, or their Serjeants, employed their customary Address and Oratory, on the Occasion, I will not venture to affirm. I doubt not but Halberds, Pikes, and even Staffs, have been promised to many of the Gentlemen Volunteers; but if the Ministry be chargeable for the Breach of all Promises made by Serjeants at the Drum-head, or over their Beer, I really think that the honourable Volunteers, who enlisted, and this Gentleman, their



their worthy Champion, are in much more comfortable Situations ; but, as it must be allowed he is an ingenious Man, we cannot suppose him in Earnest in this Sort of Objection. His Irony is very nice and bordering on the Obscure ; and People are sometimes apt to mistake him : but I will answer for it, that a moderate Pension would induce him to own all he has written to be in that Strain ; and I expect, when the Jest is discovered so happily, that he will allow me something out of it, for the Hint.

Of the same Class is the Objection against not sending my Lord *Loudon* over before those under him in Command. I cannot see how this at all subjects him to the Commands of his Inferiours. I see indeed, that where so many Jealousies subsist, and where a People, who require to be treated in a very particular Manner are to be dealt with, there might have been certain Circumstances, certain preparatory Dealings, necessary to the principal Design, which might probably enough be attended with Misunderstandings, Bickerings, and Animosities : In such a Case, surely no impossible one, the Commander in chief, whose Interest and Duty require he should be acceptable



ceptable to all Parties, ought to make himself as little as possible subject to the Ill-will of any. Those who went first might bear the Brunt of this; and he have the happy Opportunity of reconciling all Men to himself, by reconciling them to one another.

This Gentleman is not satisfied with wresting and torturing Facts to answer his Purposes, whatever these Purposes are; but when this will not do, rather than fail, he will invent Facts of such a flagrant Nature, that the very Boldness of the Falsehood goes a good Way towards making it be thought Truth; because many suppose, who are unacquainted with the Play of Party, that it is impossible any Man should dare to assert such Things, if they were not certainly true. The ingenious Author of the Letter to the People of *England* does not scruple to affirm, That a secret Article of the Peace of *Aix* forbids us to send any Ship of the Line into the *Mediterranean*. This indeed is an Article so secret, that I believe not one of the Parties to that Treaty have heard of it until this Time. I call on the Author to produce any Proof of the Existence of such an Article. If he cannot, as he certainly cannot, for there certainly is no such Article, I must beg Leave to re-  
mind



mind him, that it is some Use to a Cause to preserve the Character of some small Attachment to Truth; and that he ought to take Care that the good People of *England*, to whom he addresses himself in the Stile of a Tutor and Guardian, should pay very little Regard to a Man, who is either very *easily imposed on himself*, or very *willing to impose on others*.

But Criticisms of this Sort, without knowing or desiring to be informed of the real Nature of the Subject we criticise, are either not serious at all, or they are Things very serious indeed.

How exactly do these Gentlemen agree with our Enemies the *French* in their Judgment upon our Affairs! The Defeat of General *Braddock* is always in their Mouths, and exaggerated by every Figure which their Stock of Malice and Rhetoric can supply them; but the taking the Forts on *St. John's River*, that Part in which *France* feels a Wound most severely, and the rather as this disables her in a good Measure from applying a Remedy to those she may receive elsewhere; the driving the *French* from *Bausejour*, where they held us besieged as it were in the Peninsula; the more me-



morable Victory of *Johnson*, attended with the Circumstance of making the *French* General Prisoner: These are Things they affect to slight; the Merit of the two latter Services, is attributed wholly to the People of *New England*; but the Misfortune of the former, is charged wholly on the Ministry, though it is well known that all the Operations, those which succeeded, as well as those that failed, are Parts of one and the same Plan; and consequently not to be divided, whether we consider them with Censure or Applause.

But in whatever Light we view our own Measures, the Success the *French* have had is amplified beyond all Truth and Reason. What one Step have they advanced, or what material Advantage have they made of the Defeat of *Braddock*? Are they possessed of any one Place in which they were not established before that Event? Have they such an Army in the Field as will enable them to act upon the offensive? And do not even the Incursions of the *Indians*, Things far enough from decisive, grow every Day less and less frequent? Are these the Signs of a People who have gained a great and undoubted Superiority? And on our Side, are they Marks of a People neglected



glected and abandoned by their Ministry? It is we in Fact that have made the most material Advantages, and removed the false Land-marks with which the Ambition of *France* had bounded us, even long before the War: we have stopped their most certain Communication with their Colonies, and we have driven them from Forts of which they had been long in Possession; besides that the Advantages of *France* are passing away, whereas ours are daily encreasing. Our Colonies united, their Dissentions quieted, and their present Concord confirmed and made effective by a good Body of Troops, headed by an unexceptionable Commander, and every Part of our military Operations under a Superintendance which promises us every Thing. A People less sanguine than we are, might entertain the greatest Hopes, if they saw their Troops, under such a Direction, from a State of great Rudeness become as famous for the Strictness of their Discipline as they always were for their Courage. If they saw the Vigilance of an old Commander united to the lively and active Spirit of Youth; and if they saw the strictest and most indefatigable Study in the Art of War, perfecting a Genius, which our Enemies fear and confess: I say a Genius, because Ex-  
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perience



perience and Habit, with a moderate Degree of Attention, may make a Man, without any uncommon Capacity, walk with great Credit in the beaten Track of the military Profession; but Genius is the only Star which guides us in the pathless Wilderness of an unfrequented World. It was a Sagacity of no vulgar Kind which could penetrate at once into the Secret of that new Species of Warfare, to comprehend its peculiar and distinguishing Character, at the first Glance, to enter into the peculiar Difficulties which attended it, and to point out the Rock in this unnavigated Ocean, upon which there was the greatest Danger of splitting. These were Things which our unhappy General there, could learn by Experience only; and in learning which he lost his Life. Had this unhappy Man behaved with less Bravery, and returned with his Life, but without a Conquest, we should not have wanted some, who amongst their Murmurs at his ill Success, would not have failed to have attributed his Inactivity to private Orders. As it is, every Thing is misrepresented and condemned; the Orders that were given, which, to say no more, were certainly just and sensible, are endeavoured to be made ridiculous; but I shall only remind my Reader that this Writer  
has



has taken up with a Translation of a Translation. His Reason for doing so is plain. Had he taken the original *English*, he had missed his Aim, and not found it so easy to ridicule, as would have happened to him in his very setting out; for smart as he may be on the Words *better Orders*, I will take it on me to say, that however the *French* may have translated the Letter they found, and this Writer have taken it from the *French*, yet I say in the original *English* there is nothing to justify it. And having thus, in his setting out, detected this Writer, it would be paying him too great a Compliment to follow him all through a Piece, wherein, if there was one hundredth Part so much Wit as there is senseless Ill-Nature, I would recommend it very heartily to the Reading and Rereading of every Man that does read.

When the People are dispirited, there are never wanting Men of this Kind to make every trivial ill Success of the worst Consequence, by impregnating it with Seeds of Discord and Confusion. Thus every Advantage gained by the Enemy is doubled by the Dissension it causes at home: A People wanting in a good Opinion of themselves, and a Confidence in their Rulers, are incapable of any thing great or useful.

Those



Those Nations whose Character destined them for Empire, though full of that high Spirit, which, as it made ill Success unusual to their Arms, rendered it almost insupportable to their Minds, yet in such a Case always grew more enamoured of their Country; and, quitting their Connexions with their Party, attached themselves with stricter Bonds than ever, closely to the Orders of the State. This they knew was not a Time for Change, because they were sensible, that all beginning Administrations, especially those which owe their Birth to Faction, have two capital Faults; that they are violent, and that they are weak; they were convinced that New Men spend that Time in searching for Tools, which ought to be employed at Work; and that those who come in upon the Destruction of others, hating the Measures for the Sake of the Men, fail not to disturb the most salutary Regulations made by their Predecessors; and that at a critical Season in Politicks, as in Medicine, almost every thing depends upon not disturbing the Order and Method of Affairs.

These, as it is well known, were Principles from which the *Romans* were never known to depart; and it is to those they owed



owed their Grandeur principally, because the weaker they were abroad, the stronger and more united they became at home, and Men were encouraged to serve their Country with Chearfulness, because with Security, both in Peace and in War.

Very different was the Conduct of those giddy Nations whom Providence seemed to have marked out for a shameful Ruin, and which some Patriots would advise us to imitate. Incapable of judging but by Events, and impatient of their Condition, but without knowing how to better it, they turned their Backs to the Enemy, and their Arms upon one another. Without considering the Situation of Affairs, they expected Impossibilities from their Ministers; they changed them when they were frustrated in those Expectations, and chose new ones, who flattered them with Hopes yet more extravagant, only to deceive them in a Manner yet more fatal, and to make Way for such new Changes as a fickle People never want Pretences to make.

Such were the Manners of the *Athenians* in the base and degenerate Times of that Commonwealth; such was the Condition of *France*, when we conquered it; and  
such




such is the Spirit some Men would raise in *England*, when *France* is ready to invade us.


But a Ministry, strengthened by the Favour of their Prince, and supported by the Confidence of the unseduced and better Part of his Subjects, having done every thing, Prudence could suggest in a Time of Danger, having succeeded in many of the Objects of their Care, and having laid judicious Plans for succeeding in the rest, can never be disturbed by a Clamour grounded on one Failure, not imputable to them; nor suffer by the ill Behaviour of an Officer chosen with every Circumstance in his Favour. It is our Duty, as Men who love our Country, and are solicitous for its Honour and Safety, instead of making Use of our Losses abroad as Instruments of Confusion at home, to turn our Misfortunes to Lessons; to arm the Hands of our Ministry with all the Power of national Union, to correct our Errors and repair our Losses. There are no Men, especially those in elevated Stations, whom Malice and Envy working upon Credulity and Ignorance, cannot find Ways to blacken.

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